The Stories Of Life Are Far From Over (Jonathan Martin)

For if there is a God who not only creates but sustains and resurrects, then there can yet be life on the other side of death for all things. Then there is hope, not only for the yearning in you to drive you into union with God, but to be realized in union with those others. If death is not the final word, and chaos produces creation rather than destroys it, then many of the stories of the life you thought were long over are far from over yet.

How To Survive A Shipwreck by Jonathan Martin, p 70

David Bentley Hart’s Inconsistent Triad (3): Theodicy

In my final post on the inconsistent triad found in David Bentley Hart’s essay “God, Creation, and Evil: The Moral Meaning of creatio ex nihilo”, I’d like to talk about theodicy.

Let me say up front that, I don’t want to talk about “theodicy” as if it’s a fancy academic issue.  The word "issue" makes it seem optional, a subject for discussion within the safe confines of an ivory tower, as if we can choose when and wear to engage with it.  But we can only talk about "theodicy" in the context of a suffering and evil that humanity cannot seem to avoid, whether it be self-inflicted or not.  It is not academic or abstract.  It’s with that in mind that I hope to proceed.

Hart’s inconsistent triad:

1. God freely created all things out of nothingness
2. God is the Good itself
3. It is certain or at least possible that some rational creatures will endure eternal loss of God

In the previous post, I paralleled Hart's triad with Tom Talbott's triad.  Here, I'd like to do the same thing with a well-known triad involving the troubling question of theodicy.

The theodicy triad in its simplest form:

1. God is omnipotent
2. God is the omnibenevolent
3. Evil exists

The question is, can all 3 of these propositions be true?

As with Talbott, there are some distinct parallels between DBH’s triad and the theodicy triad.  (Note that Talbott touches on some of the differences and similarities between his triad and the theodicy triad in his Reply to Michael J. McClymond).   

If (as I proposed) Hart's 1st proposition (God freely creates out of nothingness) is an articulation (or at least closely related to) the matter of God's creative sovereignty, then we have a parallel with the first proposition in the theodicy triad (God is omnipotent).

Hart's 2nd proposition is, again, closely related to the 2nd proposition found in the theodicy inconsistent triad.  God is the Good itself is, at a bare minimum, close related to the statement that God is omnibenevolent.

But here’s the thing.  Theologians of all stripes and theological persuasions don't hesitate to pick apart this theodicy triad in ways that seek to demonstrate that the triad isn't actually inconsistent.  They argue that all 3 can be true.  If these 3 theodicy propositions can all be true, and these 3 are closely related in form to Hart's proposed inconsistent triad, is Hart’s triad not actually inconsistent?  Can the same arguments that make the theodicy triad not inconsistent be applied to Hart?  If not, what differentiates them? 

The forms that these theodicy arguments take may vary in their level of sophistication and intended audience, but they generally come back to the same thing: we can only answer the theodicy question in terms of the end, eschatologically.

In other words, God may permit certain evils for a time, but this temporal “permission” does not necessarily disprove God’s sovereign love and goodness.  While temporal evil is tragically real, it is temporal.  Evil is not eternal.  It is not permanent.  Given the reality of suffering and evil, any talks of its impermanence risks sounding trite and dismissive.  As true as that may be, what remains is that only the possible impermanence of evil saves the triad.  Only the possibility of the redemption of what evil and suffering have destroyed opens the possibility that the triad is consistent. 

Now this issue of permissive power may trip up those who possess a meticulous interpretation of divine sovereignty.  In the meticulous view, all things are the outworking of God’s will.  There can be no meaningful distinction between what God wills and what God permits.  So in this view, there is no difference between God permitting a child to die of cancer and willing a child to die of cancer.  They are one and the same, and it would be foolishness for humanity to judge God's "goodness" here based on our finite standards of goodness.  There is some truth to this of course, but the argument ultimately undermines God-talk and the possibility of faith.  Hart, having no sympathy for the argument, does not mince words:

But, when any meaningful difference between will and permission has been excluded, and when the transcendent causality of the creator God has been confused with the immanent web of causation that constitutes the world of our experiences, it becomes impossible to imagine that what God wills might not be immediately convertible with what occurs in time; and thus both the authority of Scripture and the justice of God must fall before the inexorable logic of absolute divine sovereignty.
(The Doors of the Sea, p 90)

The fact is, while (obviously) believing his own triad to be inconsistent, Hart also paints the theodicy triad as not inconsistent.  All 3 in the theodicy can be true.

How so?

It’s the distinction between the temporal/finite and the eternal.  Perhaps some answer can be offered to make sense of history, but the theodicy triad would not fare so well if evil and it's effects were given the last word.

We can all appreciate, I imagine, the shattering force of Vanya’s terrible question to Alyosha in The Brothers Karamazov.  If universal harmony and joy could be secured by the torture and murder of a single innocent child, would you accept that price?  But let us say that somehow, mysteriously – in, say, Zosima’s sanctity, Alyosha’s kiss, the million-mile march of Vanya’s devil, the callous old women’s onion – an answer is offered that makes the transient torments of history justifiable in the light of God’s everlasting Kingdom.  But eternal torments, final dereliction?  Here the price is raised beyond any calculus of relative goods, and into the realm of absolute – or infinite – expenditure.  And the arithmetic is fairly inflexible.
(God, Creation and Evil, p 12)

There may yet be an answer for these “transient torments of history”.  For now, however, no answer has been given.

every death of a child, every chance calamity, every act of malice; everything diseased, thwarted, pitiless, purposeless, or cruel; and, until the end of all things, no answer has been given.(God, Creation and Evil, p 5)

I have to confess, I want an answer.  I want reason.  Justification.  And yet, independent of want I think I want, a “bare choice” remains, one that strikes me as profoundly true:

As soon as one sheds the burden of the desire for total explanation -as soon as one has come to see the history of suffering as a contingency and an absurdity, in which grace is ever at work but upon which it does not depend, and has come also to see the promised end of all things not as the dialectical residue of a great cosmic and moral process, but as something far more glorious than the pitiable resources of fallen time could ever yield -one is confronted with only this bare choice: either one embraces the mystery of created freedom and accepts that the union of free spiritual creatures with the God of love is a thing so wonderful that the power of creation to enslave itself to death must be permitted by God; or one judges that not even such rational freedom is worth the risk of a cosmic fall and the terrible injustice of the consequences that follow from it. But, then, since there can be no context in which such a judgment can be meaningfully made, no perspective from which a finite Euclidean mind can weigh eschatological glory in the balance against earthly suffering, the rejection of God on these grounds cannot really be a rational decision, but only a moral pathos.     (The Doors of the Sea, p 68)

 So in the end, the final consistency of the theodicy triad (all 3 can be true) is contingent upon the non-finality of evil, the non-finality of all that is not well.  Hart’s inconsistent triad simply draws upon the implications of the hope of that proposition, the hope of the Gospel:

Rather than showing us how the tears of a small girl suffering in the dark were necessary for the building of the Kingdom, he will instead raise her up and wipe away all tears from her eyes – and there shall be no more death , nor sorrow, nor crying, nor any more pain, for the former things have passed away, and he that sits upon the throne will say, “Behold, I make all things new.”     (The Doors of the Sea, p 104)

David Bentley Hart’s Inconsistent Triad (2): Comparing DBH to Tom Talbott

In my previous post, I identified an inconsistent triad in the essay “God,Creation, and Evil: The Moral Meaning of creatio ex nihilo” by David Bentley Hart.

Here is Hart’s inconsistent triad:

1. God freely created all things out of nothingness
2. God is the Good itself
3. It is certain or at least possible that some rational creatures will endure eternal loss of God

The work of Thomas Talbott, author of The Inescapable Love of God, can also be viewed through and summarized by an inconsistent triad.  I’ve written about Talbott's inconsistent triad here.

Here is (a form of) Talbott’s inconsistent triad:

1. All humans are equal objects of God's unconditional love in the sense that God, being no respecter of persons, sincerely wills or desires to reconcile each one of them to himself and thus to prepare each one of them for the bliss of union with him. 
2. Almighty God will triumph in the end and successfully reconcile to himself each person whose reconciliation he sincerely wills or desires.
3. Some humans will never be reconciled to God and will therefore remain separated from him forever. 

Or to put it more succinctly:

1. God wants to "save" everyone.
2. God has the ability to "save" all that he wants to "save".
3. Some will be forever separated from God, the nature of that separation notwithstanding (eternal conscious torment, annihilation, etc.)

The parallels between Hart's and Talbott's inconsistent triads are striking.  Most striking to me, however, is how the (sometimes subtle) differences in phrasing enrich and elucidate the meanings of the first two propositions in each triad.

Hart’s 1^st proposition (that God freely created out of nothingness) corresponds with Talbott’s 2^nd proposition (that God can save all that he wants to save).  It clarifies a connection between the free creative act of God and the nature and substance of God’s “sovereignty”.  Neither of the triads argues for or against specific ways that God exercises this sovereignty, but the connection does cement the idea that creatio ex nihilo demonstrates that there is no created thing that exceeds God's creative act.  It connects beginning and end.  God is not simply sovereign overlord, God is Creator.  And not Creator meaning a sovereign overlord who has the functional power to make stuff from nothing, but Creator as the one who "calls us forth" and whose calling is grounded in an eternal telos that's never separable from the eternal nature of God.  In the words of Hart:

In the end of all things is their beginning, and only form the perspective of the end can one know what they are, why they have been made, and who the God is who called them forth from nothingness.  And in Gregory's thought, with an integrity found only also in Origen and Maximus, protology and eschatology are a single science, a single revelation disclosed in the God-man.     (God, Creation and Evil, p 16)

Hart’s 2^nd proposition (that God is the Good itself) corresponds with Talbott’s 1^st proposition (that God wants to save everyone).  It cements the connection between goodness and love, not just love as a general ideal of goodness, but as the particularity of willing the final good of the creation that God brought forth from nothing.  For many people the connection between love and goodness is perfectly obvious and goes almost without saying.  But for those who think that God's essential "goodness" need not entail a final love of all humanity, this one's for you.

So while these two inconsistent triads are worded differently, particularly the first 2 propositions, they could be combined to form a common argument: that goodness-as-love combined with sovereignty-as-creation-from-nothing means that the 3rd proposition, that some rational creatures will endure eternal loss of God, must be false.

Are DB Hart's and Talbott's inconsistent triads two ways of making the same argument?

In my next post, I'd like to look at DBH's triad in the context of theodicy.

continued

David Bentley Hart’s Inconsistent Triad (1)

It’d be hard to overstate how important the essay “God,Creation, and Evil: The Moral Meaning of creatio ex nihilo” by David Bentley Hart has been for me.  I’ve read it maybe 10 times and each time it yields some new insight that, having seen it, I can’t unsee it.    

Just recently I noticed something at the end of the essay that I hadn’t noticed before: an inconsistent triad.

While the essay itself is a fairly grueling (though highly rewarding) read for us non-academics, the triad itself is quite accessible.  Not only that, but in my reading the entirety of the essay is an exercise in sober semantic precision in support of the argument present in this sentence:

We are presented by what has become the majority tradition with three fundamental claims, any two of which might be true simultaneously, but never all three: that God freely created all things out of nothingness; that God is the Good itself, and that it is certain or at least possible that some rational creatures will endure eternal loss of God. (p 16)

To visually break up the three claims:

1. God freely created all things out of nothingness
2. God is the Good itself
3. It is certain or at least possible that some rational creatures will endure eternal loss of God

So the inconsistent triad is both a helpful lens through which to read the essay and the end to which the various arguments aim and find a simple and powerful expression.

Is Hart’s analysis sound?  That any two of these statements can be true but never all three? 

That’s the big question, of course.  What do you think?

In the next post I’d like to compare Hart’s inconsistent triad to that of another well-known and influential Christian universalist – Thomas Talbott.

continued

Love of Neighbor as Hermeneutical Key

Therefore, all such things as you wish men might do to you, so do to them as well; for this is the Law and the prophets.
 -Matthew 7:12 (DB Hart, emphasis mine)

I don't mean to be a stickler.... but here's where a guy, per divine ordinance, gets stoned for picking up sticks on the sabbath:

Then the Lord said to Moses, "The man must surely be put to death; all the congregation shall stone him with stones outside the camp."  So, as the Lord commanded Moses, all the congregation brought him outside the camp and stoned him with stones and he died."
 -Numbers 15:35-36 (NKJV)

Here’s where Paul affirms the love of neighbor hermeneutic:
For the whole Law is summed up in a single utterance to wit: "You shall love your neighbor as yourself."
 -Galatians 5:14 (DB Hart)

Here's a blessing being pronounced upon infanticide:

How blessed will be the one who grabs your babies and smashes them against the rock!
-Psalm 137:9 (NET)

Back and forth we go.  So my question is.....really?  Do unto others is the Law and the prophets?  Am I reading the same Law and prophets?

I mean, I could understand if he said, "While the ultimate goal of the Law and prophets is to form a moral world in which people are loving others as themselves (as instituted through sacrificial and ceremonial laws, etc) much of the Law and prophets prescribe what happens in the event that you don't."  Or more crudely, "the Law and prophets are about loving your neighbor as yourself.  And if you don't, we will kill you."

That is a much different that saying that "do unto others" is the Law and the prophets.  Doing unto others as they would do unto you unless they do something wrong or are in some way unworthy would be a pretty big asterisk.

I realize that there are ways to spin all of this, to salvage Jesus's words in the historical-critical sense (not an allegorical sense) of the text and make them perfectly compatible with the Golden Rule.  I happen to think that this is where things have the potential to get really, really dangerous.  The rationalizations.  The twisting of language to sound pious.

"To tolerate sin is not loving at all."

"God is loving, but He is also holy."

"We don't get to choose what 'good' is."

"Sin is very serious."

These include some truth.  They just don't resolve the issue at hand.  It's difficult to equivocate around doing unto others as you would have them do unto you.  Stoning a person is not doing unto others as you would have them do unto you.  Not in any meaningful sense.  Any moral imperative is lost in pure equivocation.

So I don't see these resolving the issue at hand for several reasons, not the least of which is the immediately prior verses in the Gospel of Matthew:

Or is it not the case that no man among you, if his son should ask for a loaf of bread, would give him a stone?  Or, if he should also ask for a fish, would give him a serpent?  If you, therefore, who are wicked, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your Father in the heavens give good things to those who ask him.
 -Matthew 7:9-11 (DB Hart)

Jesus doesn't present some inaccessible understanding of "doing unto others as you wish them to do unto you."  It is as plain as a man giving a gift to his son.  At least for Jesus, a so-called "total depravity" has not snuffed out the ability to recognize a "good gift."  He appeals precisely to this recognition.

So I'm back to my original questions:

Really?  This is the Law and the prophets?

My tone is not to be misinterpreted here.  It's not one of cynicism (well, not only cynicism!) but of wonder.

What is Jesus's hermeneutic?  How does he interpret?  How can 'I' as individual and 'we' as a collective learn this hermeneutic in a deep and formative way?

Two main points then:

One, whatever theories exist as to the nature of the Biblical texts, they need to be fully informed by this vision of Law and prophet as love your neighbor as yourself.  And not in a twisted and inaccessible way, but in a way that does justice to the simple kindness of a parent giving a gift to child.

And two, I don't think it's possible to understand Jesus without wrestling with his hermeneutic.  To Jesus, each iota and serif is only truly 'fulfilled' when viewed through the lens of the law of love.  Any other 'fulfillment' is to miss the point.

Do not think that I came to destroy the Law and the prophets; I came not to destroy but to fulfill.  For, amen, I tell you, until heaven and earth shall pass away, not a single iota or single serif must vanish from the Law, until all things come to pass.
 -Matthew 5:17 (DB Hart)


When all things come to pass, when humanity is roused from sleep and caught up in the life of God, this fulfillment will be manifest precisely as love of neighbor, and love without mixture.

Love does not work evil against the neighbor; hence love is the full totality of the Law.  This moreover, knowing the time: Now is the hour for you to be roused from sleep, for our salvation is nearer now than when we came to faith."
 -Romans 13:10-11 (DB Hart)

May this 'fulfilling' invade the present.

What kind of blessedness is it that luxuriates in revenge? (Jurgen Moltmann)

There are certainly many other movements, and much fervent zeal for the liberation of the masses.  It certainly sounds more realistic for people in darkness to dream of God's day of vengeance, finding satisfaction in the hope that at the Last Judgment all the godless enemies who oppress us here will be cast into hellfire.  But what kind of blessedness is it that luxuriates in revenge and needs the groans of the damned as background to its own joy?  To us a child is born, not an embittered old man.  God in a child, not as hangman.  That is why he prayed on his cross: "Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do."  It sounded more heroic when, forty years ago, in 1934, Hitler's columns marched through Tubingen, singing with fanatical zeal: "One day, the day of revenge.  One day, and we shall be free."  It was a zeal that led to Auschwitz and Stalingrad...

-Jurgen Moltmann, The Power of the Powerless (taken from Watch for the Light)

Heaven and Hell in Christian Thought - Thomas Talbott (5): Restricting the Scope of God's Love

The Inconsistent Triad

These posts relate to the article "Heaven and Hell in Christian Thought" by Dr. Thomas Talbott as published in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  

This essay strikes an excellent balance between being concise and being thorough in laying out the arguments and viewpoints of various Christian schools of eschatological thought without resorting to caricatures.  His project is careful to present each of these viewpoints at their strongest, for only then can productive dialogue occur.


Return to Part 1
Back to Part 4

**********

Let's now look at how Talbott addresses the Augustinian notion of God's "restricted love".

The Augustinian reasons as follows:

God's saving grace is irresistible in the end, and yet everlasting torment in hell will nonetheless be the terrible fate of some; therefore, God does not love all created persons equally and his (electing) love is thus limited in its scope.

In the end, it's fairly simple.  Grace is "irresistible" (proposition 2), yet everlasting separation is true (proposition 3).  Therefore, it must be the case that God does not love all people equally in the sense that God wills their salvation.

If a person is not saved it is because God doesn't want them to be saved.  His electing love, being irresistible, cannot and must not extend to them.  Period.

For some people this salvation equation is sheer theological fact.  "Mysterious" as to the reasons for God's "free" choice to save some and not others, but not mysterious in it's sheer necessity.  On the other hand, for those who either (1) come from a tradition that doesn't hold to the Augustinian version of "irresistible" grace or (2)come from a tradition that does view salvation through the lens of the Augustinian version of "irresistible" grace but didn't realize the necessity of this limited scope of God's salvific will, this is a scandalous assertion.  Shocking.  For some, heretical.

The assertion naturally leads to some important theological questions like:

What??  

God doesn't want all people to be "saved"?  

How and where do we see such an idea defended philosophically?  Biblically?  Theologically?

What about those parts of scripture that would seem to indicate that God does indeed want all to be "saved"?

1 Timothy 2:4 is one example of an isolated verse commonly used to affirm God's desire to save all people without exception:

who desires everyone to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. (NRSV)

For a person who needs to restrict the scope of God's (electing) love and sees this verse as holding some sort of authority, this verse is a problem.  What can be done?  But here is how Augustine explains it :

"the word concerning concerning God, 'who will have all men to be saved,' does not mean that there is no one whose salvation he doth not will...but by 'all men' we are to understand the whole of mankind, in every single group into which it can be divided...For from which of these groups doth not God will that some men from every nation should be saved through his only-begotten Son our Lord."  (Enchiridion) 

So for Augustine, "all" must merely mean "all kinds" or "some" individuals from "every group".  This is the necessary exegetical move.  God simply cannot be said to will the salvation of all people (as defined in proposition 1) and maintain any Augustinian theological coherence as defined by the acceptance of propositions 2 & 3.  So any Bible verse that seems to say otherwise ("all" as meaning literally "all people") cannot really be doing so.  It must be shoved off to the side or dismantled.

The logic of it is not difficult to see.  Simple.

Now some proponents of the Augustinian view of "limited election"argue, quite simply, that God does not love the non-elect at all.  Others, like the contemporary philosopher Paul Helm don't argue that God doesn't "love" all people or that "love" is not of God's very essence.  Instead, Helm seems to dismantle the connection between God's love and God's salvific will.  Helm argues that God's loving nature or God's loving actions towards human beings do not necessitate that God's redemptive love extends equally to all people.  The argument goes, just as there are differences within the created order (male/female, etc), there can be differentiations with respect to God's redemptive purposes.  Essentially, God being love in God's essence and being loving towards God's creation does not mean that this love is necessarily and finally redemptive in nature.

Helm does not here seek to throw out the language of "love" but rather to rework it's semantic content to fit into an Augustinian framework by:

1. creating a special category of "love" called "redemptive love" and arguing that the former does not necessarily entail the latter
2. viewing divine love on a sort of sliding scale, the minimum level of which may be called "love" but doesn't include the will to save

Jeff Jordan takes a similar approach.  He argues that God's love need not be maximally extended for it to be love.  He finds the idea of "equal love" to be an impossibility because love is not defined by uniformity.  In other words, divine love need not be salvific in it's aims for it to be divine "love".

----------

A lot of foundational things to work through here.  Personally, I'd prefer to see the language of "love" thrown out all together than see it's semantic content be reduced to a rubble of Augustinian equivocation.  Preference aside, the implications of going down this path are, I think, stunning and disastrous.

For me, the questions that arise out of this section are:

1. When does "all" mean "all"?
2. What is the connection between who God is and what God does?
3. We may very well be dealing with definitions of "love" that are are semantically different.  So what do we mean by the word "love"?  
4. Does God being "loving" entail that God wills the ultimate good of the object(s) of his love?  Or can "love" will something less (and far worse) that the ultimate good of the beloved and still be called "love"?
5. What are the protological (in-the-beginning) implications of a limited love?

continued